Pakistan's Accidental Prime Minister

By OMAR WARAICH
Yousuf Raza Gilani is the Prime Minister of Pakistan and as such is visiting the U.S. this week. He came to the role via tragedy, elevated from the vacuum created by the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, the former Prime Minister to whom he had long been loyal. Despite Gilani's title, however, it is Bhutto's widower, the controversial Asif Ali Zardari, who is the true power behind Bhutto's People's Party and who has made the bulk of the decisions from his heavily guarded home in a leafy Islamabad neighborhood. Zardari is not shy about his influence, using words like "my government" and referring to himself as a "father" to the People's Party, just as Bhutto was its "mother." But now, Gilani, four months after he was elected Prime Minister, has begun to play a more assertive role.
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The reviews so far have been mixed. Gilani, 56, who is from southern Punjab, has a reputation as an understated politician. He "is still adjusting to his role as Prime Minister and discovering the territorial limitations of his office," says political commentator Nusrat Javed. "But recently he has become more confident and more visible." Increased visibility, however, incurs risks, as evidenced by Gilani's first televised address two weeks ago. Dressed in a stiff black coat and flanked by two flags, the Prime Minister hailed the "defeat of dictatorship" and vowed to fulfill his government's many ambitious promises. But he was awkward on air. On occasion, he would turn to the side to speak, facing away from the camera. Then the teleprompter gave up; moments later a shot of the Himalayas filled the screen, as aides scrambled to locate a hard copy of the speech to hand to Gilani.

Riven by internal disputes and weighed down by the pressures of a fast-souring economy, Gilani's coalition government is seen as too weak to act. Indeed, he seems to have only nominal control of the powerful ISI, Pakistan's security and intelligence apparatus, which has a reputation for acting on its own; and he is seen as ceding many prerogatives of the Prime Minister's office to Zardari and to Rehman Malik, Bhutto's security chief who is now, in effect, Pakistan's Minister of the Interior. Says political analyst Talat Masood: "The present government is not in a position to tackle the serious concerns facing this country. It has hardly started to clarify its own position on extremism and terrorism."

As he set off for his first visit to Washington on Saturday, Pakistan's new Prime Minister turned to the crowd gathered on the tarmac to issue a reminder. "This is our own fight. This is our own cause," he said of his country's faltering campaign against militancy. The message is unlikely to inspire many of the Pakistanis he leaves behind. Nor will it calm the anxieties that wait for him in the U.S.

In Pakistan, the visit is widely seen as important, and it has been heavily followed by the media. It will be the first time that the Bush Administration will welcome a civilian leader of the Pakistani government. "Until now, President Bush has only ever dealt with President [Pervez] Musharraf," says Masood. "Gilani will try and present himself as a democratic alternative and win support for the new dispensation. The United States has always preferred dictators over democrats, and a lot of that has to do with the geostrategic importance that Pakistan has."

The three-day visit, which includes meetings with Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Robert Gates, comes at a time of renewed frustration with Islamabad's efforts to tame al-Qaeda and the Taliban in its wild North-West Frontier Province. A sample of what Gilani may hear when he steps into the Oval Office on Monday was on offer earlier this week. In the latest of a flurry of warnings, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that "more needs to be done" to choke off the flow of militants across the border from Pakistan. "We understand that it's difficult, we understand that the North-West Frontier area is difficult, but militants cannot be allowed to organize there and to plan there and to engage across the border," she told reporters during a visit to Australia.

Much of this exasperation, echoed by Western diplomats in Islamabad, stems from the government's decision to negotiate a series of peace deals with the Pakistani Taliban in the rugged tribal areas and across swathes of the North-West Frontier Province. "It is clear that the deals have led to a rise in cross-border attacks," says a senior Western diplomat, echoing other critics, "and [those in Islamabad] just seem to be turning a blind eye to them."

By contrast, the Musharraf years held obvious appeal for Washington. As a man in control of both the army and the government, the former army chief wielded greater power, and when necessary, he could be counted on to resist public opinion. Gilani's struggling civilian government is deeply susceptible to public opinion, with recent polls consistently recording majorities hostile to the use of military force. A survey published by the International Republican Institute last week revealed that 71% supported the negotiations with militants, 61% urged "development and education" as a means of countering the threat and a mere 9% were in favor of the use of military force.

A few days after his awkward TV appearance, Gilani traveled to Peshawar, where he sought to enlist the support of tribal elders from South Waziristan, the mountainous base of Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud. "I ask you people to tell me how to deal with elements bent upon militancy," he pleaded, an elaborate turban on his head. The use of military force, he told them, will only be a last resort. Many fear that it may be resorted to only when it is too late.

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Olmert warns of more bulldozer attacks in capital

Prime minister tells Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, 'Those who think basic pattern of life in Jerusalem will continue as it is, with 270,000 Arab residents, must take into account more bulldozers, trucks and private vehicles.' He estimates Hizbullah refraining from avenging Imad Mugniyah's death as 'Nasrallah has lost his self-confidence in anticipating Israel's response'
Amnon Meranda
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert conveyed a relatively calming message Monday at the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, saying that Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah is afraid and is therefore refraining from avenging the death of the organization's senior commander Imad Mugniyah.
However, addressing the recent bulldozer attacks in Jerusalem, the prime minister had a less optimistic message, hinting that the solution was to divide the capital.
"Whoever thinks the basic pattern of life in Jerusalem will continue as it is, with 270,000 Arabs living in Jerusalem, must take into account that there will be more bulldozers, trucks and private vehicles. There is no way to prevent such acts of terror. We must consider dealing with this issue in the future."
The prime minister briefed the committee on Israel's geostrategic situation, stressing that there has been no change over the past few months.
"We continue to deal with the same basic threats which have characterized the past two months, and simultaneously, we are going ahead with the diplomatic processes we were engaged in," he said
Olmert noted that the chances for a flare-up on the northern front in the near future were "highly unlikely". Hizbullah, he said, is busy with internal Lebanese politics and with its efforts to restore its status in Lebanon following the war.
"Over the past two years they have been significantly deterred from a military conflict with us in southern Lebanon," he said.
Olmert at with committee chair MK Tzachi Hanegbi (Photo: Dudi Vaaknin)
Olmert estimated that Hizbullah would try to avenge the "disappearance" of Imad Mugniyah, but added, "It appears to me that it's afraid to respond. Nasrallah has lost his self-confidence in his ability to anticipate Israel's reaction. They are afraid of a disproportional Israeli response."
The prime minister added that Hizbullah "continues to grow stronger, and we are following this closely and are sensitive to any change that may violate the balance which we wish to keep unchanged."
As for the negotiations with Syria, the prime minister noted, "There is no doubt that the negotiations created certain options for the Syrians, which did not exist before. They are still small and more limited than some of the government's critics ascribe to them."
He lashed out at attempts by unofficial elements in Israel to establish relations with Damascus.
"There is quite of bit of international suspicion against Syria due to its background and past. They continue to take a parallel route of contact with Iran, terror in Iraq, aiding Hizbullah and the terror organizations in the Judea and Samaria territories. This increases the feeling that they are taking two parallel routes.
"The Syrians will have to understand that both routes cannot be taken. The entire world cannot be deceived part of the time – or part of the world most of the time – but the entire world cannot be deceived all the time."
Brigadier-General Yossi Baidetz, head of the research division at the Military Intelligence Corps, told the committee that the recent prisoner exchange deal with Hizbullah boosted the terror organizations.
Devoted to truce
Olmert went on to explain why Israel must stick to the ceasefire in Gaza despite the violations.
"The question we are facing right now, and we assumed this would happen in advance, is whether today's circumstances justify an operation against Hamas, with all the ramifications. According to estimates, the violations have yet to create a good enough reason to change the situation, but this does not mean that this estimate won't change in the near future."
As for the negotiations with the Palestinians, it appears the optimism is decreasing.
"I don’t believe we'll be able to reach an understanding which will include the Jerusalem issue this year," Olmert said. "However, on the rest of the core issues the gaps are not dramatic. On the refugee issue we can lead to an understanding that will not make us take responsibility or solve the matter in the boundaries of the State of Israel.
"The gap is unbridgeable also in terms of the borders. We will bring the issue to a democratic decision, which takes into account all the views in the State of Israel."

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Brzezinski Warns of Afghanistan Offensive

I wrote a post a couple weeks ago outlining Juan Cole's concern over the emerging U.S. strategy to send more troops to Afghanistan in light of the increasing level of violence and a resurgence of Taliban influence. From that post:

If the Afghanistan gambit is sincere, I don't think it is good geostrategy. Afghanistan is far more unwinnable even than Iraq. If playing it up is politics, then it is dangerous politics. Presidents can become captive of their own record and end up having to commit to things because they made strong representations about them to the public.

Afghan tribes are fractious. They feud. Their territory is vast and rugged, and they know it like the back of their hands. Afghans are Jeffersonians in the sense that they want a light touch from the central government, and heavy handedness drives them into rebellion. Stand up Karzai's army and air force and give him some billions to bribe the tribal chiefs, and let him apply carrot and stick himself. We need to get out of there. "Al-Qaeda" was always Bin Laden's hype. He wanted to get us on the ground there so that the Mujahideen could bleed us the way they did the Soviets. It is a trap.

Beware.

Former National Security Advisor, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, is expressing concerns as well:

"I think we're literally running the risk of unintentionally doing what the Russians did. And that, if it happens, would be a tragedy," Brzezinski told the Huffington Post on Friday. "When we first went into Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban, we were actually welcomed by an overwhelming majority of Afghans. They did not see us as invaders, as they saw the Soviets."

However, Brzezinski noted that just as the Soviets were able to delude themselves that they had a loyal army of communist-sympathizers who would transform the country, the U.S.-led forces may now be making similar mistakes. He said that the conduct of military operations "with little regard for civilian casualties" may accelerate the negative trend in local public opinion regarding the West's role. "It's just beginning, but it's significant," Brzezinski said.

His own program for improving the state of affairs in Afghanistan -- where U.S. casualties have surpassed those in Iraq for two months now -- revolves around pragmatism. He believes Europe should bribe Afghan farmers not to produce poppies used for heroin since "it all ends up in Europe." Moreover, he thinks the tribal warlords can be bought off with bribes, with the endgame being the isolation of Al-Qaeda from a Taliban that is "not a united force, not a world-oriented terrorist movement, but a real Afghan phenomenon."

Many historians believe the 9 year long Soviet-Afghan War became one of the factors leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union. The resistance from the (U.S. backed) Afghani Mujahadeen forces took the Soviets completely by surprise and was a significant embarrassment to the mighty Soviet army. From a paper by Rafael Reuveny and Aseem Prakash (The Afghanistan war and the breakdown of the Soviet Union):

The war impacted Soviet politics in four reinforcing ways: (1) Perception effects: it changed the perceptions of leaders about the efficacy of using the military to hold the empire together and to intervene in foreign countries; (2) Military effects: it discredited the Red Army, created cleavage between the party and the military, and demonstrated that the Red Army was not invincible, which emboldened the non Russian republics to push for independence; (3) Legitimacy effects: it provided non-Russians with a common cause to demand independence since they viewed this war as a Russian war fought by non Russians against Afghans; and (4) Participation effects: it created new forms of political participation, started to transform the press/media before glasnost, initiated the first shots of glasnost, and created a significant mass of war veterans (Afghansti) who formed new civil organizations weakening the political hegemony of the communist party.

The Soviets had no idea what they were getting into when they invaded Afghanistan. Nine years later, they were forced to retreat with the tail between their legs.

I just wish I had more confidence the folks currently running the show are, at least, thinking about these issues.

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Obama, Iraq and Afghanistan

Barack Obama, in advance of an overseas trip to Europe and the Middle East, has written an Op-Ed in todays New York Times, "My Plan for Iraq".

It's a good summary of his position on the war, draws distinctions between the Obama plan and the McCain (lack of) plan, and does a reasonable job at massaging the timetable issue some believe he muddied with recent comments. The article also includes the common wisdom (among the left at least) that the war in Iraq has diverted attention from the real enemy; al Qaeda and the Taliban forces in Afghanistan. Obama argues

Ending the war is essential to meeting our broader strategic goals, starting in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where the Taliban is resurgent and Al Qaeda has a safe haven. Iraq is not the central front in the war on terrorism, and it never has been. As Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently pointed out, we won’t have sufficient resources to finish the job in Afghanistan until we reduce our commitment to Iraq.

As president, I would pursue a new strategy, and begin by providing at least two additional combat brigades to support our effort in Afghanistan. We need more troops, more helicopters, better intelligence-gathering and more nonmilitary assistance to accomplish the mission there. I would not hold our military, our resources and our foreign policy hostage to a misguided desire to maintain permanent bases in Iraq.

Juan Cole, President of the Global Americana Institute, dissects Obama's proposal and sees two major problems: leaving a small, residual force in Iraq and devoting resources to the fight in Afghanistan.

If there is only a small force in (Iraq), who will rescue them if their helicopter gets shot down or they are ambushed and besieged? Then, how would a small American unit be any good against a terrorist organization operating in remote parts of Sunni Iraq? They don't know Arabic, can't hope for really good intelligence from locals, etc. Wouldn't it be more efficient to let the Special Police Commandos of the Iraqi Interior Ministry take care of this sort of thing?

And then there is the problem that the Iraqis are demanding veto power over US operations in Iraq, a demand that will only grow with time. If they don't concur that a Sunni group is terrorists, the Baghdad government could just keep the US unit cooling its heels.

If the Afghanistan gambit is sincere, I don't think it is good geostrategy. Afghanistan is far more unwinnable even than Iraq. If playing it up is politics, then it is dangerous politics. Presidents can become captive of their own record and end up having to commit to things because they made strong representations about them to the public.

Afghan tribes are fractious. They feud. Their territory is vast and rugged, and they know it like the back of their hands. Afghans are Jeffersonians in the sense that they want a light touch from the central government, and heavy handedness drives them into rebellion. Stand up Karzai's army and air force and give him some billions to bribe the tribal chiefs, and let him apply carrot and stick himself. We need to get out of there. "Al-Qaeda" was always Bin Laden's hype. He wanted to get us on the ground there so that the Mujahideen could bleed us the way they did the Soviets. It is a trap.

Beware.

Is Cole right? It's probably wise to not trust those who believe there's only one right path to reaching an objective. (Jeez, one would think we would have learned that lesson at this point). But I do think we took our eye off the ball and left Afghanistan dangling while we went off to fight a misguided war in Iraq. All agree the situation in Afghanistan is worsening; the American death toll is rising every month and now routinely exceeds the monthly toll in Iraq. Clearly, the current approach is not working.

These are high stakes. I hope a President Obama would have the good sense to listen to lots of voices describing other, perhaps less obvious, paths to reaching an objective.

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Iraq: Even If We Win We Lose

By Jules R. Benjamin

Mr. Benjamin, PhD University of Pennsylvania, is a retired professor of history (Foreign Policy and International Relations). He is the author of A Student's Guide to History.

Has George W. Bush surged to victory in Iraq? If so, he can thank Iraqi tribalism, the success of ethnic cleansing, the loss of legitimacy by Al Qaida in Iraq, the “standing down” of the Sunni militias and Iran’s willingness to let its friends in Baghdad make their own peace with Washington. The anti-U.S. Shia militia of Muktada al Sadr also left the field. Only one factor behind victory was made-in-USA: the success, finally, of the counterinsurgency wing of the U.S. military in shifting tactics from policing a civil war to dividing the insurgency. Why it took five years to figure this out is worth pondering. Nevertheless, the shift in tactics would not have made much difference had not the other developments also occurred. By that time the damage to Iraq, to our military and economy had already occurred.

While the Bush administration may have been surging to victory, most Americans came to realize that the war, sold as a way to eliminate Saddam’s WMDs and his secret alliance with Osama Bin Laden and to spread the blessings of liberty throughout the Middle East, had very different aims. One didn’t need to be a conspiracy theorist to conclude that the war was mainly geostrategic in its goals. Saddam was evil but less because he “gassed his own people” (he also gassed Iranians but they don’t count) than because he had the will (and might at some point have had the ability) to use his military forces and Iraqi oil reserves to upset the strategic balance in the Middle East. He might have evaded sanctions, sold Iraqi oil for Euros rather than dollars, threatened Israel, intimidated the emirates, invaded Saudi Arabia, etc. Then again, conscious of his own weakness, he might not have done any of these things. The war came when the Bush administration decided to eliminate these geostrategic risks by preemptive war.

For the administration, the evil dictator theme worked long enough and well enough to defy opposition to the war. Many Americans and much of the media had heard the vague references to the roles of strategic position and oil wealth. But they were satisfied that the “real” motives were things that they (or someone else) could properly die for.

There were very large anti-war demonstrations well before the leaks and exposes of the post-2003 period. Many Americans refused to accept the lies and the imperial motives that hid behind them. Still, the Bush administration was able to move toward war because many Americans, fooled or not, wanted to “liberate” Iraq; wanted to secure access to oil; wanted to “stand tall.” Even when they could peek behind the curtain, they did not look too closely. A similar orientation explains the reaction of much of the media and of the opposition in Congress.

Of course there were news organizations and political forces that found the lies easy to believe or that accepted the need for them. More significant was that most of the media was not willing to challenge a “wartime” president. Once George Bush − with the aid of the events of 9/11 − declared war on terror, his power was immense. In newsrooms and minority caucuses people were susceptible to the fear that powerful political voices and many millions of Americans would easily label dissent at that point as treason. To be effective, opposition forces had to face that fear directly. It would have to challenge the lies of the administration at a time when evidence of them was not great and when even saying that the president was “lying” made one's own motives suspect. It would have to challenge the coziness with power of some media and the fear of that power by others. Most difficult perhaps, it would have to challenge the fear of the American people, their trust in their leaders, and, in some, the desire to hear the eagle scream again. Finally, war with Afghanistan had gone unchallenged and had already been “won.” In the coming months we will again face the difficulty of challenging one war while accepting another, especially when much of the justification for one has been applied to the other.

Some Americans want to live in the seat of an empire. For them pre-emptive war is not so difficult to justify. When America invades other nations because they might threaten its interests and when it consciously chooses war because it possesses huge military forces, then citizens of the empire can be proud − even while others are ashamed.

The main danger of geostrategic wars (aside from their “collateral damage”) is that our republic can be grievously wounded by them. A war fought by a republic is lawful and in defense of values that serve the republic. This is why lies become necessary and not only to hide the true motives but to allow us to look away when the sausage of empire is being made. Demonizing the enemy and questioning the loyalty of any who challenge the policy help us to believe that our empire somehow serves our republic when the opposite is the case.

Reasonable citizens of a republic may understand that conducting high-tech war abroad does little to prevent small groups of terrorists from flying planes into office towers; that an aggressive, militaristic foreign policy assures that a “war on terror” of some kind will never end. Still, we should not assume that such points are obvious or persuasive. The irony implicit in an “empire of liberty” is one that has haunted us from the start. Now it offers us a war to assure our economic interests in the Middle East. It declares victory in that war just as the structure of the U.S. economy begins to topple. The rent fabric of the rule of law may now catch on the broken windows of abandoned homes.

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Achieving Victory in Afghanistan

Dave Schuler | Monday, July 21, 2008
In anticipation of Sen. Barack Obama’s visit to Afghanistan I thought it might be appropriate to consider the situation there. Both Sens. McCain and Obama have called for achieving victory in Afghanistan. Sen. Obama has characterized the conflict there as “the war we need to win” and has called for

…taking the fight to the terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Sen. McCain recently called for an Iraq-like “surge” in Afghanistan:

It is by applying the tried and true principles of counter-insurgency used in the surge — which Senator Obama opposed — that we will win in Afghanistan. With the right strategy and the right forces, we can succeed in both Iraq and Afghanistan. I know how to win wars. And if I’m elected President, I will turn around the war in Afghanistan, just as we have turned around the war in Iraq, with a comprehensive strategy for victory.

But victory in Afghanistan, however defined, is far from a sure thing. Juan Cole, professor of Middle Eastern history and America’s preeminent expert on Shi’ism, recently expressed pretty serious skepticism:

If the Afghanistan gambit is sincere, I don’t think it is good geostrategy. Afghanistan is far more unwinnable even than Iraq.

ISAF Commander Dan McNeill in Der Spiegel estimated the requirements for pacifying Afghanistan:

ISAF Commander McNeill has said himself that according to the current counterterrorism doctrine, it would take 400,000 troops to pacify Afghanistan in the long term. But the reality is that he has only 47,000 soldiers under his command, together with another 18,000 troops fighting at their sides as part of Operation Enduring Freedom, and possibly another 75,000 reasonably well-trained soldiers in the Afghan army by the end of the year. All told, there is still a shortfall of 260,000 men.

A year and a half ago, Col. Pat Lang, formerly an intelligence and special forces officer and the first professor of Arabic at the U. S. Military Academy, expressed optimism with respect to Afghanistan at a Middle East Policy Council forum:

In fact, if you had more troops and more people who were skilled at doing the kind of work that I’m familiar with and the right kind of diplomats and more foreign assistance and things of that kind, I think you could really still make something of Afghanistan. And it probably wouldn’t take a whole lot more in the way of troops.

Since then the following was written by a guest blogger at Col. Lang’s blog:

The US is in a bind. It has to deny the Pakhtun insurgency (the Taliban are only one part of it) the use of the tribal areas as a base. With Pakistan showing no will to control these areas, it is threatening to take unilateral military action there. This will obviously be through air strikes and Special Forces raids, both notorious for their inevitable “collateral damage”. This will add fuel to the fire of militancy, pushing more recruits into the ranks of the jihad, especially the deadly suicide bombers. An insurgency cannot be defeated by a few successful decapitation strikes, or even by turning a rugged mountainous base area into a free-fire zone. The more perceptive US commanders probably know this, but they have to be seen to do something about the continuous guerrilla attacks. How long will the NATO allies stick around fighting an unwinnable war? How long will the US public put up with it?

But that is not the worst of it. Believing Pakistan to be complicit in the US strikes on their people, the tribal militants will turn on it; they have already seen the deadly effect of their suicide bombs in the teeming cities. An already fragile governmental and societal structure will face severe stress; anything could happen. One thing is certain : the religious fundamentalists in the country will take full advantage of this turmoil. For the US, the first impact will be on their supply line through Pakistan. Then, Pakistan itself, as an ally, will be at risk.

One of the most difficult things for both statesman and soldier is to recognize a war as unwinnable before it is proven in the field.

Some Afghans have expressed substantial skepticism about the value of increased foreign troop strength in the country:

Kabul, July 20 (DPA) Ahead of Senator Barack Obama’s expected visit to Afghanistan, the US presidential hopeful’s plans to increase US troops in the country was being met with both hope and scepticism from Afghans.

“Increasing troops doesn’t help Afghanistan at all,” warned Kabeer Ranjbar, a member of the lower house of the Afghan National Assembly. “Afghanistan’s governmental institutions need to be reformed. The problem is the Afghanistan government itself.”

“Afghanistan government needs to gain people’s support,” he said. “If the government doesn’t have people’s support, increasing of forces doesn’t help Afghanistan.”

I’ve long been a skeptic about our efforts in Afghanistan. The logistics of supplying a larger force than we have there now is truly daunting, complicated by the reality that everything we bring into the country must be brought by air or overland through Pakistan. That increases the cost of operations there.

The operations are quite dangerous, too. Our casualty rate per 1,000 troops has been higher in Afghanistan than it is in Iraq for some time.

Since our invasion in 2001 we have successfully overthrown the Taliban and introduced a new government in the country. Unfortunately, that government doesn’t have a great deal of influence outside the capital city. We have been partially successful at expelling Al Qaeda and the Taliban from the country but are unable to completely secure the country as long as Al Qaeda and the Taliban remnants are able to flee across the border into Pakistan. The Pakistani government has either been unable or unwilling to prevent this and, understandably, is reluctant to allow our forces free rein in their country.

There are a number of questions we might consider. What would victory in Afghanistan look like? Given present constraints how can it be achieved? What will the cost of achieving it be? How long will it take? Are the costs and timeframe politically acceptable?

About the Author: Over the years Dave Schuler has worked as a martial arts instructor, a handyman, a musician, a cook, and a translator. He's owned his own company for the last thirty years and has a post-graduate degree in his field. He comes from a family of politicians, teachers, and vaudeville entertainers. All-in-all a pretty good preparation for blogging.

He has contributed to OTB since November 2006 but mostly writes at his own blog, The Glittering Eye.

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Military Institutional Communication: Its Geostrategic Importance

Dr. Alexandre Sergio da Rocha*
Editorial Abstract: Foreign-language military journals such as Air and Space Power Journal in Portuguese have supported US national policy since the 1940s by disseminating the Air Force’s operational concepts and fostering coalition military operations. Dr. da Rocha, a Brazilian professor, highlights the strategic importance of the world’s Portuguese-speaking nations, contending that journals published in languages other than English are especially vital for building international understanding among militaries.
Since the end of World War II, the US military has recognized the importance of military institutional communication and has used academic-professional journals as a prime medium for conducting it. Reading the editorial in the fourth-quarter 1999 issue of Airpower Journal, Brazilian edition (now Air and Space Power Journal em Português), one discovers that the Portuguese and Spanish editions of the Journal, originally called Air University Quarterly Review, began with a letter dated 1 December 1948 from Gen George C. Kenney, Air University commander, to Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg, chief of staff of the US Air Force (USAF). General Kenney asked for permission to launch the aforementioned foreign-language publications.1 By granting permission, the USAF followed the example set by the US Army, whose professional journal, Military Review, had appeared in Spanish and Portuguese since 1945. In fact, the USAF swiftly embraced the cause of foreign-language institutional communication because the Spanish and Portuguese editions of Air University Quarterly Review began only about one year after the USAF became an independent service in 1947. The journal’s name later changed from Airpower Journal to Aerospace Power Journal and then, more recently, to Air and Space Power Journal (ASPJ), but the effort has continued uninterrupted for more than 50 years, and its purpose has never changed.

Many senior military leaders from the United States and Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking countries have expressed their appreciation for the contribution made by the foreign-language editions of the Journal, as we can read in the 50th-anniversary commemorative issues of both those journals from 1999. However, their messages are not just congratulatory in nature. In fact, they provide an assessment of the publication’s value to the USAF and the air forces of countries that comprise the target audience of these editions.

Referring to the journals, Gen Lloyd W. “Fig” Newton, then commander of Air Education and Training Command, commented, “Through the years, their thought-provoking articles have helped provide the intellectual framework for our institutions and have promoted significant operational advancements” (emphasis added).2 Maj Gen (Brigadeiro) José Américo dos Santos, then commander of the Brazilian Air Force University/Air War College, pointed out that the Portuguese edition was relevant and instrumental for “updating data regarding military equipment and employment doctrine.”3 He also declared that “Airpower Journal has . . . becom[e] the reference publication of choice in the country’s professional military education environment.”4 Gen Michael E. Ryan, then the USAF chief of staff, noted that

both Latin American editions have become widely read and respected by airmen throughout the more than 25 Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking countries of the Western Hemisphere, Europe, and Africa. The journals disseminate core USAF doctrine, strategy, policy, operational art and current issues. Both editions play a very important role in strengthening our relationship with their air force audiences. They also serve to educate, develop and nurture these officers as their careers progress. By shaping the dialogue among airmen, the journals bring them closer together across the geographical and cultural lines separating them.5 (emphasis added)

So one can see that the medium for military institutional communication with Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking countries initiated by the USAF immediately after its own inception has had a specific goal of “disseminat[ing] core USAF doctrine, strategy, policy, operational art and current issues” (General Ryan’s words) in order to promote “significant operational advancements” (General Newton’s words).

This article makes three points. First, dissemination of core USAF doctrine, strategy, policy, operational art, and current issues in order to promote significant operational advancements is very important—if not essential—to supporting US military activities worldwide in defense of US national-security interests. This claim was true in the aftermath of World War II and is even more so today in an era when combined military operations and coalition warfare are clear US foreign-policy imperatives. Second, academic-professional journals in languages other than English are particularly appropriate for reaching the goals of USAF leaders, mentioned above. Third, due to geostrategic considerations, the existence of specialized vehicles for military institutional communication in Portuguese is even more imperative today than it was 59 years ago, when General Kenney asked for approval to publish what is now the Portuguese edition of ASPJ.

The Need to Share Knowledge
In her article “Operation Iraqi Freedom: Coalition Operations,” Squadron Leader Sophy Gardner, Royal Air Force, writes that

we, the US and UK militaries, left the end of phase three of Operation Iraqi Freedom having worked successfully as a coalition and having faced practical challenges along the way. We can see that these were largely overcome through a combination of fortuitous timing (an extended planning period), strong personal relationships (particularly at the senior levels), mutual dependence and burden sharing . . . and a motivation to find common ground and to engineer solutions to any problems that threatened the coalition ’s integrity. Most importantly, trust was established at all levels. For the future, whether we consider either mindset, doctrine, and culture, or equipment, concept of operations, and interoperability—it is mutual cooperation and contact which will provide us with the best chance of staying in step.6 (emphasis added)

Lt Col Frank M. Graefe of the German air force expressed similar concepts in his article “Tomorrow’s Air Warfare: A German Perspective on the Way Ahead”:

Due to the United States’ military-pioneering role and technological superiority, that country will predominantly determine the developments in warfare over the next several decades. Therefore, one would do well to take a closer look at the US policy documents and strategy papers that will govern such developments and to draw lessons from the US conduct of operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Doing so will help identify the changes that coalition partners of the United States have to follow in order to ensure compatibility in terms of the conduct of operations.7 (emphasis added)


Awareness of the need for mutual understanding between the US military and its military allies seems so important to US policy makers that a number of schools in the United States afford the opportunity for contact among these militaries. Such is the case with Air War College, Air Command and Staff College, and Squadron Officer School, all located at Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama; Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania; Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island; Naval Postgraduate School, Presidio of Monterey, California; as well as the Inter-American Defense College; National Defense University; and the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, all located in Washington, DC.

At these institutions, the mutual cooperation and contact (mentioned by Squadron Leader Gardner) to foster compatibility in terms of the conduct of operations (pointed out as an interoperability requirement by Lieutenant Colonel Graefe) do effectively occur. In fact, such contact also offers a way to better familiarize allied militaries with US military doctrine, strategy, policy, and operational art and to enable significant operational advancements. These outcomes are also important products of the successful USAF institutional-communication efforts by the foreign-language ASPJ editions because operational advancements are a prerequisite for interoperability. When people must work together, knowledge sharing becomes essential as a basis for achieving shared understanding. Whether involving the meaning of words denoting specific activities through the proper working of weapon systems and tools for guidance, communication, and so forth, or the commander’s expectations about the strategic and operational performance of troops under his or her watch, without shared understanding, misunderstandings will certainly occur—and misunderstandings in warfare oftentimes lead to death and undesired destruction.

The Need for Military Institutional
Communication in Languages other than English
Regardless of the value of contacts among militaries of different countries, they do not constitute a suitable replacement method for disseminating core USAF doctrine, strategy, policy, operational art, and current issues through academic-professional journals—the main source of what Gen José Américo referred to as updating data regarding military equipment and employment doctrine.

The Need to Publish in Languages other than English

Today one can imagine deeming English an international language. If so, then English-language media for military institutional communication would achieve the objective of disseminating core USAF doctrine, strategy, policy, operational art, and current issues in order to promote significant operational advancements. This, however, is not the case.

Col John Conway’s article “The View from the Tower of Babel: Air Force Foreign Language Posture for Global Engagement” discusses the need for proficient foreign-language speakers in the Air Force to assure appropriate mutual understanding and operational effectiveness when American troops interact with personnel from non-English-speaking countries during military operations.8 Such mutual understanding requires (1) that people speak a common language, and (2) that they communicate in the other country’s language instead of in English. Thus, the USAF understands that it should not expect effective conveyance of its message to allies without providing US personnel proficient in foreign languages—even to deal with the simplest matters concerning situations of everyday life. In terms of disseminating core USAF doctrine, strategy, policy, operational art, and current issues in order to promote significant operational advancements—certainly a more subtle and complex matter—one could not expect full understanding without expressing the ideas in the foreign reader’s own language. Again, to recall the ideas of Squadron Leader Gardner and Lieutenant Colonel Graefe, such an understanding is essential to interoperability.

Moreover, military institutional communication is not directed only to a military audience whose interests could focus on topics such as technical instruction, knowledge about advances in available war-fighting technology, doctrine, and operational art. One must pay attention to other issues beyond the specific aspect of military interoperability. For example, through military institutional communication, foreign military and civilian leaders can become better informed about US military goals and procedures. Having these leaders understand this information can prove crucial to American interests when a country has to decide whether or not to participate in US-led coalitions or vote for or against American interests on relevant matters of common defense or foreign policy in international deliberating forums. Because democracy is gradually becoming a global way of life, one cannot, in turn, restrict such decisions to a national elite or an oligarchy. Rather, the decision needs to find legitimacy among the other country’s population.

In his article “Planning for Legitimacy: A Joint Operational Approach to Public Affairs,” Maj Tadd Sholtis shows the importance of legitimacy as a center of gravity for military public affairs:

Legitimacy derives from real and readily apparent behaviors or effects that define the functional relationships between the military and key publics. Domestically, such behaviors would include the extent of political maneuvering or public protests against military actions, imposed tactical restrictions on fire and maneuver, and blows to unit morale, defense spending and military recruiting. Abroad, legitimacy will affect the military contributions of our allies, basing options, transportation routes for force deployment and re-supply, and grassroots support for terrorist or insurgent attacks against U.S. forces, among other considerations. . . .

. . . Legitimate military operations will promote public expressions of support from a wide variety of non-aligned sources: national leaders or their official spokespeople, international organizations, political or special interest groups, other opinion leaders like academics or clerics, or populations as a whole.9

So legitimacy can be essential to the success of military operations, especially in coalition warfare.

Legitimacy implies conforming to recognized principles or accepted rules and standards, which brings about, in people affected by a decision or action whose legitimacy comes under scrutiny, the willingness to bear the results of such a decision or an action. Of course, good information about the basis and justification for the decisions or actions at stake serves as a fundamental part in building their legitimacy. The dissemination of good information requires making it available in the language of the people whose acknowledgment of the legitimacy of such decisions or actions one desires. Therefore, military institutional communication has relevance to disseminating information about technology, doctrine, and operational art. This communication perhaps becomes even more important to instilling within the population of a country whose support for those actions one desires, the idea of legitimizing planned or executed military actions. One can view recent decisions to begin publishing Arabic, French, and Chinese editions of Air and Space Power Journal as supporting this reasoning. Thus it seems clear that a country with global interests, such as the United States, must maintain a significant effort in military institutional communication in languages other than English.

The Utility of Academic-Professional Journals

Academic-professional journals meet the requirements of disseminating ideas and retaining legitimacy. First, they are essential for updating the target audience’s information on issues that concern them. Indeed, the number of military officers who become aware of technological innovations or innovative strategic analyses by reading academic-professional journals is far greater than the number of those who can leave their units for an extended time to learn or participate in exchange programs with professional-military-education institutions abroad. Also, journals can reach a greater variety of audiences, including academics, decision makers, and people at large who have an interest in political and strategic studies. Such individuals exercise a multiplier effect merely by conveying the acquired ideas to other people and offering new ones emerging from reflection about what they have learned through the journals. In this case, they present feedback that generates debate and helps to illuminate technical issues as well as promote intellectual solidarity among researchers who participate in the conversation—both effects are important to accomplishing the goals of military institutional communication. Moreover, if the journal maintains high academic standards, it acquires intellectual prestige, which adds value to the information the journal conveys, making the published information automatically worthy of attention and reflection from potential readers. Now comes the legitimacy issue.

Legitimacy is far better attained by means of open and serious debate through an academic journal than through propaganda. Free and good-faith academic debate seeks to reach a consensus, which means a “kind of collective consciousness attained as a result of rational discussion.”10 Consensus contrasts with homonoia, a Greek word literally meaning sameness of minds and connoting a “kind of collective consciousness attained through an emotional venue, resulting from behavioral conditioning through the employment of rites, forceful discipline and other means—more or less ­subtle—to crystallize reflexes.”11

History clearly shows that consensus serves as a typical source of decisions in democracies, while dictatorships—especially those that disguise themselves by adopting some external trappings of democracy—use homonoia as a preferred tool for manipulating people. So a procedure of institutional communication that self-imposes the constraints of a rational discussion conducive to consensus benefits from a net advantage as a foundation for legitimacy. This is precisely what happens in the case of academic-professional journals.

Geostrategic Considerations in Finding Target
Audiences for Military Institutional Communication
Having established that military institutional communication with non-English-speaking countries must occur through academic-professional journals in languages other than English, we must examine which languages deserve preference. In fact, budgetary constraints always impose the need for choices based on priorities. As mentioned before, more than 50 years ago the USAF, like the US Army, became aware of the usefulness of publishing journals in Spanish and Portuguese for military institutional communication. One can easily understand the choice of the Spanish language for a journal on the grounds of obvious US interests in Spanish-speaking countries located in its neighborhood—Mexico and Central American countries—whose citizens comprise a significant percentage of the US population. But why Portuguese?

In his article “Origins of Western Hemispheric Defense: Airpower against the U-Boats,” Maj Roger J. Witek comments on the geostrategic importance of the South Atlantic from an airpower point of view. In his discussion, the South Atlantic means primarily Brazil and Argentina, one a Portuguese-speaking country and the other Spanish-speaking.12 Taking into account the role played by different countries during World War II, one sees that negotiations which led to the establishment of a US air base in the Brazilian city of Natal, essential to US military operations in North Africa, reflect Brazil’s geostrategic importance. However, a classic geostrategic analysis of Brazil’s stature in the international equation lies beyond the scope of this article. Among the reasons for not conducting such an analysis are innovations in war-fighting technology that have brought significant changes to the strategic meaning of several variables that one should consider.

Hence, we will look for more objective parameters to help make our point. We base our contention that the Portuguese language has been and remains indispensable to US military institutional communication on the values of a potential indicator (PI)—an index of the geostrategic relevance of various countries in the world, based on variables traditionally associated with expectations of a country’s possibly becoming a world power. After classifying the countries of the world by PI, one sees that Brazil merits a significant communication effort in its language.

The Potential Indicator—Trying an Objective Analysis

Building indicators is a traditional technique for quantifying variables relevant to measuring a phenomenon. When such measurement depends on several variables, the numerical indicator that measures it must consist of a composite of those variables, and the indicator’s value must be directly proportional to the variables positively correlated with the phenomenon—as well as inversely related to those negatively correlated with it.

Traditionally, one evaluates a country’s potential in the psychosocial, political, economic, and military realms. Thus, the PI proposed here consists of a composition of meaningful variables from these four realms of national power. Moreover, for optimum usefulness, one must build the indicator on variables with objectively measured, well-known, and available values for every element—in this case countries—that we compare. Therefore, we have chosen the following variables: population (psychosocial), territorial area (political), gross national product (GNP) (economic), and military expenditures (military).

These variables are widely acknowledged as partial PIs. One usually deems countries with large populations and vast territories potential world powers. Analysts commonly rank the world’s economies by GNP values—well-known, widely employed economic indicators. Military expenditures synthesize several variables, encompassing not only the size of the military but also its technological sophistication, factoring in the relationship between weapon complexity and expenditure. Both features seem reasonable criteria for gauging potential military effectiveness. Additionally, military expenditure has the advantage of taking into account aspects related to science and technology, at least in military applications. The product of these four variables for each country represents its PI value. To ensure uniformity of data, we have drawn the variables’ values from the current edition of The World Factbook, published by the Central Intelligence Agency. Since that reference does not include the value for Russian military expenditures, we obtained that figure from the Web site of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. For Russia, despite the lack of assurance of methodological uniformity in obtaining the value, one may reasonably assume that values do not diverge by an order of magnitude. Because our analysis uses orders of magnitude only, an occasional discrepancy will not invalidate the argument.

To validate this indicator, we applied it to countries usually considered the most important in the world through the use of the size-of-economy criterion, as shown by those nations’ respective GNP values. The results validate PI as an indicator of relevance on the world scene (table 1). The table does not show Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking countries because they appear in tables 2 and 3. One can see that the PI values reflect the importance generally associated with countries. Specifically, the calculus of the US PI is consistent with its position as the world’s sole superpower. The Russian PI reflects the country’s importance after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
One can also categorize countries by the order of magnitude of their PI (table 4). Three countries have PIs of an extremely high order of magnitude: the United States, China, and India. Such values reflect the geostrategic importance of China and India, demonstrated by the special-status policies applied to these countries by the United States—for instance, US agreements to provide India with the latest generation of weaponry without requiring interruption of that country’s nuclear program. Brazil follows Russia in an intermediate category—very high PI—between the three gigantic countries (United States, China, and India) and powers such as Japan, Canada, France, Germany, Mexico, and the United Kingdom. One should note that Mexico follows the main European countries and Japan, even though its PI is an order of magnitude lower than Brazil’s. Argentina is located between Italy and Spain in the group whose PI is an order of magnitude smaller than Mexico’s—fairly high PI. Among Spanish-speaking countries, we find Colombia, Chile, Venezuela, and Peru in the significant PI category.
PI offers an objective criterion to assert a language’s geostrategic importance, putting aside fallacious reasoning, which could distort sound judgment. For instance, some people pay attention to the number of countries that share a language as their native tongue—an immaterial observation. Each country is a distinct political entity, with different people and governments expressing different interests and political wills on the world scene. English has acquired its present global relevance because it is the language of the world’s sole superpower, not because it is the language of a number of countries without any geostrategic meaning—or because of the number of English speakers around the world.

One should note that during the apogee of the British Empire, no one acknowledged English as the international language because, regardless of the United Kingdom’s status as a very important world power, its geostrategic level of importance was comparable to that of other colonial powers. Only after the United States became a superpower, especially after its rise to the status of sole superpower, did English become the world’s lingua franca. Similarly, the relevance of Spanish to US military institutional communication has no relationship to the number of Spanish-speaking countries or Spanish speakers. Rather, the prominence of that language reflects the existence of countries such as Mexico (whose PI has an order of magnitude of 106) and Argentina (whose PI has an order of magnitude of 105).

Of course, in specific cases one must take into account geostrategic considerations other than PI. For instance, one cannot analyze Portugal and Spain by their PI while ignoring their pertinence to the European Union. In this sense, Argentina’s PI is more relevant to a geostrategic analysis of Argentina than Spain’s PI is to Spain because the latter, as a member of the European Union, finds itself in a different context. Likewise, specific American interests in Central America and the Caribbean make the countries in those regions a source of special concern in US foreign policy, independently of their PIs.

However, since Brazil has a PI just below that of the three giants (United States, China, and India) and Russia, and above that of Japan, Canada, France, Germany, Mexico, and the United Kingdom, the US military cannot afford to lack Portuguese-language media for military institutional communication. Therefore, Portuguese editions of professional military journals merit continued priority from the US military leadership. Furthermore, such a quantitative argument corresponds with qualitative considerations when one notes the increasing influence of Brazilian foreign policy in Portuguese-speaking African countries such as Angola and Mozambique—regionally relevant countries whose PI analysis lies beyond the scope of this article. However, the recent decision to publish a French edition of Air and Space Power Journal, aimed at reaching primarily the French-speaking African countries, shows that the USAF recognizes Africa’s growing geostrategic importance. Moreover, the position of Brazil in South America and its policy of continental integration—inscribed as a rule in the Brazilian constitution as of 1988—extend its influence to Spanish-speaking neighbors with fairly significant PIs.

As a matter of fact, US officials have made a number of comments regarding Brazil’s geostrategic importance. During her confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee after being nominated by Pres. George W. Bush as secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice declared that “the U.S. relationship with Brazil is ‘extremely critical to the region’ [and] applauded Brazil’s leadership of the U.N. stabilization mission in Haiti.”13 During his visit to Brasilia, Brazil’s capital, on 6 November 2005, President Bush remarked, “Relations between Brazil and the United States are essential.”14 Another US official, Commerce Deputy Secretary David Sampson, stated that “the United States and Brazil are ‘close friends’ and that strong U.S.-Brazil leadership is important for the Latin American region.”15

However, one finds the most expressive synthesis of Brazil’s present relevance on the world scene in an article titled “Eyes on the Americas,” which comments on Canada’s connections with Latin America and describes Brazil as “an emerging priority”:

While multilateral cooperation in the hemisphere is critical, Canada’s relations with individual countries of the region are also vital. A key tie is with Brazil, an emerging giant comprising half of South America’s population and GDP [gross domestic product], identified in Canada’s recent International Policy Statement as a priority nation.

“Brazil is a major, sophisticated and influential player on the multilateral scene, whether it is in world trade negotiations as leader of the G20 or in UN peacekeeping operations,” notes Florencia Jubany, a senior policy analyst at the Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL) in Ottawa. “Brazil is also a central actor in the Americas, and shares many points of convergence with Canada’s own foreign policy.”

Jamal Khokhar, Director General of the Latin America and Caribbean Bureau at FAC [Foreign Affairs Canada], says that Canada and Brazil “not only share a hemisphere, they share goals, priorities and—perhaps most important of all—values.” This makes the two countries natural partners, he says. “We are living in a world of rising powers and Brazil is one of those powers. Canada appreciates Brazil’s leadership and believes it can make a difference in the hemisphere.”16

Brazil is a force behind South American integration and has played a moderating role, which is critical given the economic hardships in neighboring Andean nations such as Bolivia and Ecuador and the potential for political unrest there.17 Brazil’s consistent adherence to the principle of people’s self-determination worldwide and to the strengthening of its own democracy instills in its neighbors the confidence to make the Brazilian government’s formal or informal mediation a factor of stability in South America. Moreover, the good personal relations cultivated by Brazilian president Luis Inácio Lula da Silva with President Bush as well as South American leaders such as Argentinean president Nestor Kirchner, Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez, and Bolivian president Evo Morales facilitate international dialogue and enhance the already acknowledged geostrategic importance of Brazil.

The Portuguese Edition of Air and Space Power Journal:
A Success Story
One can cite the Portuguese edition of ASPJ as an example of the USAF’s successful efforts in military institutional communication. Indeed, General José Américo writes that “Airpower Journal has established itself as an important vehicle for the exchange of ideas and has created a partnership between [the US Air Force’s] Air University and the Brazilian Air University.”18 Numerical data reinforces the veracity of his assessment (table 5). The number of articles by Portuguese-speaking authors published in the English and Portuguese editions of ASPJ since 2000 is impressive. The existence of the Journal’s Portuguese edition enabled the contribution of 24 Portuguese-speaking authors, who wrote 26 articles. During the same period, the Journal’s English edition published five articles by Portuguese-speaking authors. The Portuguese edition creates a valuable venue that allows English- and Portuguese-speaking militaries to exchange ideas about professional topics.
Since the end of World War II, the US military has been aware of the importance of using journals to disseminate core US doctrine, strategy, policy, operational art, and current military issues for the benefit of militaries from non-English-speaking countries. That is why academic-professional journals such as the Spanish and Portuguese editions of Military Review and Air University Quarterly Review—now Air and Space Power Journal—have come about. Such publications provide information to the US military’s allies concerning defense policies, strategy, military technology, military organization, and many other topics needed to enhance interoperability in case of participation in combined war-fighting operations.

Academic-professional journals serve several purposes. They promote debate, offer innovative solutions to problems, and disseminate information that allows easier understanding and more favorable analysis of US military activities by both military and civilian officials, as well as people interested in political and strategic studies. Such dissemination is also part of an effort to build a sense of legitimacy among allies regarding American military activities, generating the political and military support needed in coalition warfare.

The use of languages other than English is indispensable despite the increasing number of people familiar with that language. Indeed, full understanding of complex matters requires communication in the speaker’s or reader’s native tongue. It is not a coincidence that Spanish and Portuguese were the very first languages chosen for such a dissemination of knowledge. In fact, this choice was a response to a geostrategic need in the aftermath of World War II that remains fully valid today.

One should avoid simplistic criteria for choosing the languages to promote military institutional communication. For example, the number of countries or individuals who speak a particular language is immaterial compared to objective geostrategic considerations. Rather, a quantitative PI comprised of population, territorial area, GNP, and military expenditures can better measure the relative prominence of nations. The PIs of various countries can differ by orders of magnitude. The United States, as the world’s sole superpower, has a PI whose order of magnitude is 1010, followed by China (109), India (108), and Russia and Brazil (both 107). Among Spanish-speaking countries, Mexico has the greatest PI (106).

PI is an objective criterion of geostrategic importance whose analysis validates the priority of the Portuguese language in the US military’s efforts in institutional communication. Of course, this does not suggest that the Spanish language or efforts driven by other strategic considerations are not worthy. Instead, this article makes the point that the US military must use Portuguese for communication because the numeric value of Brazil’s PI reinforces the recognition of that country’s geostrategic importance, as already acknowledged by US and Canadian officials. The successful example of the Portuguese edition of Air and Space Power Journal in attracting the participation of Portuguese-speaking authors shows that a Portuguese communication channel favors the exchange of ideas and dissemination of knowledge among an audience whose geostrategic importance as a target for military institutional communication is guaranteed by the very high order of magnitude of Brazil’s PI.

*The author wishes to thank Mr. Almerisio Lopes, editor of Air and Space Power Journal em Português, for kindly providing or confirming data related to the Journal, especially about the number of articles contributed.

Feedback? Email the Editor]

Notes

1. Almerisio B. Lopes, “Editorial,” Aerospace Power Journal, Edição Brasileira, 4° Trimestre, 1999, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-p/4tri99/editoria.htm.

2. “Fiftieth Anniversary of the Latin American Editions of Aerospace Power Journal,” Aerospace Power Journal 13, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 64, http://www.airpower.maxwell
.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj99/win99/latam.pdf.

3. Maj Gen (Brigadeiro) José Américo dos Santos, “Airpower Journal: 50 anos de intercâmbio,” Airpower Journal, Edição Brasileira, 4° Trimestre, 1999, 8, http://www.airpower
.maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-p/4tri99/santos.pdf.

4. “Fiftieth Anniversary,” 65.

5. Ibid., 63.

6. Squadron Leader Sophy Gardner, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: Coalition Operations,” Air and Space Power Journal 18, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 98, http://www.airpower.maxwell
.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj04/win04/win04.pdf.

7. Lt Col Frank M. Graefe, “Tomorrow’s Air Warfare: A German Perspective on the Way Ahead,” Air and Space Power Journal 19, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 39–40, http://www
.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj05/fal05/fall05.pdf.

8. Col John L. Conway III, “The View from the Tower of Babel: Air Force Foreign Language Posture for Global Engagement,” Air and Space Power Journal 19, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 57–69, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj05/sum05/sum05.pdf.

9. Maj Tadd Sholtis, “Planning for Legitimacy: A Joint Operational Approach to Public Affairs,” Chronicles Online Journal, 8 June 2005, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/sholtis.html.

10. Alexandre Sergio da Rocha, “Os Meios de Comunicação Social como Fator de Poder no Mundo, em Particular no Continente Americano, e sua Influência na Formação da Consciência Nacional” (paper presented to the IV Simpósio de Estudos Estratégicos [Argentina-Brasil-Uruguai], Brasília, 1990), 13.

11. Ibid.

12. Maj Roger J. Witek, “Origins of Western Hemispheric Defense: Airpower against the U-Boats,” Air and Space Power Journal em Português, 4° Trimestre, 2003, 14–30, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-p/2003/4tri03/witek.html.

13. Scott Miller, “Western Hemisphere Important to U.S. Agenda, Rice Says: United States Will Work to Promote Democracy, Development in Region,” US Department of State, http://usinfo.state.gov/wh/Archive/ 2005/Jan/19-751896.html.

14. Granja do Torto, “President Bush Meets with President Lula of Brazil,” The White House, http://www.white
house.gov/news/releases/2005/11/20051106-1.html (accessed 6 March 2006).

15. “U.S.-Brazil Cooperation on Trade Is Crucial, Says U.S. Official: Commerce Department Official Outlines Areas for Closer Cooperation,” US Department of State, http://usinfo.state.gov/wh/Archive/2006/Jan/27-588350.html (accessed 6 March 2006).

16. “Eyes on the Americas,” Canada World View 28 (Winter 2006): 7, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/canada-magazine/ issue28/menu-en.asp (accessed 12 November 2006).

17. Since the first publication of this article in the Air and Space Power Journal em Português, developments in South American international politics have only reinforced this claim.

18. “Fiftieth Anniversary,” 65.

Dr. Alexandre Sergio da Rocha (BSc, PhD, ­Federal University of Rio de Janeiro) is a private consultant and university professor. He has served as an advisor to the Inter-American Defense College; as a member of the Brazilian delegation to the Inter-American Defense ­Board; as head of the Psychosocial Studies Division of the Brazilian National War College; and as a professor and director of the Institute of Physics at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, as well as special advisor to the president of that university. Dr. da Rocha has authored a number of journal articles, essays, and chapters in books


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